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I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2007, the Delaware General Assembly amended the Delaware
State Constitution to permit the Supreme Court of Delaware to accept certified
questions from the Securities and Exchange Commission.' The amendment
reads in relevant part:
To hear and determine questions of law
certified to it by other Delaware courts, the
Supreme Court of the United States, a Court
of Appeals of the United States, a United
States District Court, the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission, or the
highest appellate court of any other state,
where it appears to the Supreme Court that
there are important and urgent reasons for an
immediate determination of such questions
by it. The Supreme Court may, by rules,
define generally the conditions under which
questions may be certified to it and prescribe
methods of certification.
The Division of Corporations of Delaware summarized the anticipated
consequences of the amendment as follows: "...[t]o bring critical and urgent
questions concerning Delaware law to the Delaware Supreme Court. The
amendment provides the SEC with access to expedited decisions and greater
* Third-year law student at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, Class of
2009.
1 S.B. 62, 144th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2007); see also Press Release, Supreme
Court of Delaware, Delaware Constitutional Amendment Enacted Allowing the
Securities and Exchange Commission to Bring Questions of Law Directly to the
Delaware Supreme Court (May 15, 2007), available at
http://courts.delaware.gov/courts/Supreme%20Court/pdf/?deconstamendO51507pdf.pd
f.
2 Del. Const. art. IV, § 11(8)
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certainty with regard to matters of Delaware corporate law." 3 In no other area
of corporate governance has the interrelation between state and federal law
become more important than the validity of shareholder proposals under Rule
14a-8. As Professor Robert B. Ahdieh notes, "[u]nder Rule 14a-8, in fact,
these roles are so intertwined that it becomes difficult to tell a coherent story
about discrete federal versus state law and analysis."4 The amendment stands
to change radically the dichotomy between state and the federal government,
as it relates to corporate governance and shareholder proposals under Rule
14a-8.5 Under the SEC's current operation of Rule 14a-8, state actors have
been shut out of the interpretative process. 6 Therefore, the amendment to the
Delaware State Constitution could be the first in a series of state constitutional
amendments that permit the SEC to certify questions to the highest court in the
state of incorporation. Moreover, the amendment could represent a shift
toward minimizing the role of the SEC in evaluating shareholder proposals,
implicating serious federalism concerns.7
The amendment to the Delaware State Constitution is a welcomed
development. More states should seriously consider adding such an
amendment to their respective state constitutions. Furthermore, the SEC
should refrain from ruling on the merits of shareholder proposals pursuant to
Rule 14a-8 for the following reasons. First, providing state courts an expansive
3 Department of State: Division of Corporations, 2007 Amendments to Delaware
Corporate Law, http://www.corp.delaware.gov/2007amend.shtml (last visited October
7, 2008).
4 Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federal Rules to Intersystemic Governance in Securities
Regulation, 57 EMORY L.J. 233, 235 (2007).
5 Rule 14a-8(i)(1) provides in relevant part: "Question 9: If I have complied with the
procedural requirements, on what other bases may a company rely to exclude my
proposal? (1) Improper under state law: If the proposal is not a proper subject for
action by shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the company's
organization[.]" See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1). The note to 14a-8(i)(1) also contains
the following language: "Depending on the subject matter, some proposals are not
considered proper under state law if they would be binding on the company if
approved by shareholders. In our experience, most proposals that are cast as
recommendations or requests that the board of directors take specified action are
proper under state law. Accordingly, we will assume that a proposal drafted as a
recommendation or suggestion is proper unless the company demonstrates otherwise."
See id.
6 Robert B. Ahdieh, The Dialectical Regulation of Rule 14a-8: Intersystemic
Governance in Corporate Law, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 165, 172 (2007) (noting that "the
SEC's operationalization of Rule 14a-8 has not included any mechanism of state
involvement").
7 See e.g., Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretation in SECNo-
Action Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
921, 1009-1012 (1998) (noting that courts should be reluctant to afford great deference
to interpretations of state law by the SEC because SEC staff are not experts in state
law governing corporate governance).
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role in the interpretation of state law is consistent with the text of the Rule.
The text seems to envision a cross-jurisdictional framework to foster
cooperation between the state and federal government.8 Contrary to the text of
the Rule, however, the SEC has put itself in the forefront of applying Rule
14a-8 at the exclusion of state actors. 9 Second, state courts have developed the
requisite expertise in interpreting and applying their own statutes concerning
corporate governance. As previously noted, the SEC has not clearly articulated
a role for state courts in the operation of Rule 14a-8. Nor has Congress sought
to engage state courts that have the expertise and experience to resolve
ambiguous issues of state law. 10 Third, in terms of efficiency, a clear
interpretation of state law through the certified-question amendment to the
Delaware State Constitution will eliminate the need for protracted litigation.
State courts will be able to set doctrinal rules via precedential authority to
govern future cases and provide greater guidance for the SEC when issuing
no-action letters, which often lack substantive analysis of the applicable state
law. 11 The ambiguous no-action letters generally leave the parties unclear as to
their responsibilities toward each other. Therefore, to avoid the inefficiencies
and contradictions arising from the current use of Rule 14a-8, the amendment
to the Delaware State Constitution may represent the initial step toward a more
active role for state courts in interpreting state law and an improved system for
evaluating the validity of shareholder proposals overall.
In this article, Part II discusses the operation of Rule 14a-8 and the
process by which the SEC evaluates shareholder proposals. Part I-A also
discusses the application of Rule 14a-8 by the SEC and federal courts and the
problems that result, which include a lack of substantive analysis by the SEC
and federal injections into state law governing shareholder proposals. Part fl-B
outlines the implications of the amendment on Rule 14a-8 and the SEC. Part
I1-B also discusses the issues that the amendment was intended to address. Part
III discusses the case of CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, the
first case to be brought to the Delaware Supreme Court by the SEC pursuant to
the amendment's certification provision, and its effect on future SEC and
federal court adjudications. Part IV concludes the note, summarizing the
effect that the amendment to the Delaware Constitution will have on the
interplay between the SEC and Delaware's court system.
8 Ahdieh, supra note 4, at 234 (noting that "Rule 14a-8 creates one of the most
significant opportunities for cross-jurisdictional engagement in U.S. securities law").
9 Ahdieh, supra note 5.
1o See id; see e.g., Securities andExchange Commission v. May, 229 F.2d 123 (2d Cir.
1956) (congressional delegations of authority to SEC to make rules constitutional).
'1 Ahdieh, supra note 5, at 177.
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II. RULE 14A-8 AND SEC EVALUATION OF SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS
A shareholder proposal is defined as a "recommendation or
requirement that the company and/or its board of directors take action, which
the shareholder intends to present at a meeting of the company's
shareholders."' 12 Shareholders owning at least $2,000 in market value or 1% of
the company's securities are entitled to submit a proposal to be included on the
company's proxy card at the next shareholders' meeting.' 3 An eligible
shareholder may only submit one proposal per a shareholders meeting, and the
proposal, accompanied by a supporting statement, may not exceed 500
words. 14 Provided the shareholder meets the threshold requirements, the
company will ordinarily place the proposal on the proxy card at the next
shareholders' meeting. The company, however, can object to the proposal for a
number of reasons, including if the proposal is improper under state law of the
relevant jurisdiction. 15 If the company declines to include the proposal in its
proxy materials, the company can request a no-action letter from the SEC's
Division of Corporation Finance pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j). 16
12 69 AM JUR.2D Securities Regulation-Federal § 642; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
8(a).
" 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)-(b)(1).
14 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)-(d).
15 Rule 14a-8, supra note 5. Rule 14a-8 also permits a company to exclude a
shareholder proposal for the following reasons: (1) if a proposal, if implemented,
causes the company to violate any state, federal or foreign law that it is subject to; (2)
if the proposal or supporting statement is contrary to any ofthe SEC's proxy rules; (3)
if the proposal is a product of personal grievances or special interest; (4) if the
proposal relates to operations that account for less than 5 percent of the company's
total assets at the end of the most recent fiscal year, and less than 5 percent of its net
earnings and gross sales for its most recent fiscal year, and is not significantly related
to the company's business; (5) if the company would lack the power or authority to
implement the proposal; (6) if the proposal relates to an election for membership on
the company's board of directors; (7) if the proposal deals with a matter relating to the
company's ordinary business operations; (8) if the proposal conflicts with one of the
company's own proposals to be submitted to shareholders at the same meeting; (9) if
the company has already substantially supplemented the proposal; (10) ifthe proposal
substantially duplicates another proposal already submitted by another proponent that
will be included in the company's proxy materials for the same meeting; (11) if the
proposal deals with substantially the same subject matter as another proposal or
proposals that has or have been previously included in the company's proxy materials
within the preceding 5 calendar years; and (12) if the proposal relates to specific
amounts of cash or stock dividends. See e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8.
16 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(j)(1)-(2); see also Apache Corp. v. New York City
Employees'Ret. Sys., No. H-08-1064, 2008 WL 1821728, at *2-*3 (S.D. Tex. April
22, 2008) (describing the process in which defendant obtained a no-action letter from
the SEC); Nagy, supra note 7, at 939 (noting that companies that omit shareholder
proposals often request no-action letters in support of their decisions).
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If a no-action letter is granted, the shareholder can request review by
the Commission. Although the Commission retains discretion to review the
issuance of a no-action letter, a grant of a no-action letter by the SEC generally
serves as the catalyst to civil litigation. 17 In the majority of cases, the Division
of Corporate Finance makes a staff recommendation to the Commission to
decline to review the matter. The Commission generally accepts the
recommendation without qualification. 18 If the Commission declines to engage
in review, directjudicial review at the federal appellate level is barred.' 9 If the
Commission does review the decision to issue a no-action letter, however,
direct judicial review at the federal appellate level is available.2 ° In reaction to
the issuance of an adverse no-action letter, a small minority of plaintiff
shareholders have challenged the constitutionality of the SEC's ability to
promulgate rules as an improper delegation of Congress' legislative power.2'
Challenges to the constitutionality of the SEC's rule-making authority have
been uniformly rejected.22 The more common course of action for
shareholders after receiving a no-action letter is to initiate a direct action in
federal court to avoid the potential foreclosure ofjudicial review. Therefore,
federal courts are often compelled to examine the rationale underlying the
SEC's decision to issue a no-action letter, thereby opening the door to
protracted litigation and an unguided endeavor into state law.
17 See e.g., Apache Corp., at *3 (defendant filed for declaratory judgment after
receiving a favorable no-action letter from the SEC); see also Medical Comm. for
Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (plaintiff commenced litigation
challenging the SEC's authority after receiving adverse no-action letter), vacated as
moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972); see also New York City Employees'Ret. Sys. v. SEC, 45
F.3d 7, 10 (2d Cir. 1995) (appeal from a Commission affirming the disposition of a
no-action letter).
18 Thomas P. Lemke, The SEC No-Action Letter Process, 42 BUS. LAW. 1019, 1039
(1987).
'9 15 U.S.C. § 77i (1994); Nagy, supra note 7, at 945 (noting that judicial review is
foreclosed under the Securities Act and the Administrative Procedure Act because
there is no final agency decision to review) (citing Kixmiller v SEC, 492 F.2d 641,
643-644 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
20 See id.
21 See e.g., SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947); see also May,
229 F.2d at 123; United States v. Guterma, 189 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
22 See id; see also United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. International Paper Co., 801 F.
Supp. 1134, 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that the express congressional goal of
"enlightening" the shareholder is served by SEC rule) (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-
Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970)).
23 See Apache Corp., supra note 17.
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A. The Problematic Application of Rule 14a-8 by the SEC and
Federal Courts.
The federal court endeavors into state law in evaluating the validity of
shareholder
proposals are hindered by the lack of substantive analysis provided by no-
action letters issued by the SEC. SEC no-action letters are often brief, in many
cases only comprising of 3-4 sentences. The following response is typical of
the SEC's response to complex Rule 14a-8 issues presented by shareholder
proposals under state law:
The proposal recommends that the board
adopt cumulative voting. There appears to be
some basis for your view that Pfizer may
exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(2).
We note that in the opinion of your counsel,
implementation of the proposal would cause
Pfizer to violate state law. Accordingly, we
will not recommend enforcement action to
the Commission if Pfizer omits the proposal
from its proxy materials in reliance on rule
[sic] 14a-8(i)(2). 24
In response to criticism that no-action letters are too succinct and do not
address the underlying legal dispute between adverse parties, the SEC
contends that no-action letters are informal responses and not intended to be an
25official statement by the SEC on the current state of the law. Accordingly,
federal courts have afforded little deference to no-action letters.26 Federal
courts have concluded that no-action letters are at most, "nonbinding,
persuasive authority., 27 Notwithstanding the SEC's issuance of a no-action
24 See Pfizer SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 653392 (March 7, 2008).
25 See 17 C.F.R. § 202.1(d).
26 See e.g., Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. SEC, 15 F.3d 254,257
(2d Cir. 1994); see also Am. Fed'n of State, County, and Mun. Employees v. Am. Int'l
Group, Inc., 361 F. Supp.2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), overruled on other grounds, 462
F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006).
27 See Amalgamated, 15 F.3d at 257. A secondary question of judicial deference to
SEC no-action letters arises when considering the Supreme Court's holdings in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under
the two-step analytical framework of Chevron, a court must first ask whether
congressional intent can be clearly ascertained from the text ofthe statute. If so, that is
the end of the analysis. If congressional intent is silent or ambiguous and an agency
has promulgated a regulation or interpretation of the statute, a court must ask the
second question of whether the regulation or interpretation is based on a permissible
construction of the statute. Unless the regulation or interpretation is arbitrary,
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letter, federal courts still must "independently analyze the merits of a dispute
even when affirming the SEC's conclusion.,
28
With federal courts exercising their authority to hear cases as a matter
of first instance, irrespective of a SEC no-action letter, the question emerges
about whether the SEC should be engaged in the practice of evaluating
shareholder proposals under state law at all. No-action letters issued by the
SEC do not adequately explain the legal doctrine and analysis underlying its
legal conclusions under state law. Nor do no-action letters purport to "impose
29
or fix a legal relationship upon any of the parties" involved in the litigation.
Although the SEC contends that no-action letters are merely interpretive of the
applicable Securities Exchange Act Rules, shareholders and companies alike
often believe that no-action letters are dispositive of the underlying legal
issue.30 In many cases where a party seeks a no-action letter from the SEC,
numerous documents are enclosed stating the arguments for and against
excluding the shareholder proposals. 3' Many of the documents enclosed read
similar to briefs on the merits filed in civil court.3 2 Moreover, while a no-
action letter serves as a relatively low-cost alternative to federal court
litigation, it can be a timely endeavor. The more novel or complex the
shareholder proposal and the applicable state law, the longer the SEC will take
to issue the letter.33
capricious, or otherwise unreasonable, a court must give the agency regulation or
interpretation controlling authority. See id at 842-843. In the context of no-action
letters, the D.C. and Second Circuits have held that no-action letters do not rise to the
level of SEC rule-making or agency adjudication. See Roosevelt v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416,427 (D.C. Cir. 1992); New York City Employees'Ret.
Sys., 45 F.3d at 7; Amalgamated, 15 F.3d at 257-258.
28 See Apache Corp., at *4 (citing New York City Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Brunswick
Corp., 789 F. Supp. 144, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
29 See Amalgamated, 15 F.3d at 257.
3 0 Nagy, supra note 7, at 954 (noting that "securities law practitioners and their clients
generally regard the regulatory interpretations in no-action letters as a source of law");
see also Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46
VAND. L. REv. 1129, 1151 (1993) (noting that the SEC creates a "federal common law
as to what constitutes a proper subject for shareholder action.").
31 Electronic Arts, Inc. SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 2191145 (May 23, 2008) (82
pages of documents filed).32 See e.g., J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 809040 (March
24, 2008).
33 Lemke, supra note 18, at 1030 (noting that parties filing for no-action letters can
expect to wait between 30 and 60 days and that novel or complex issues can take an
indefinite amount of time); see also Lanny A. Schwartz, Suggestions for Procedural
Reform in Securities Market Regulation, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 409
(2007).
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Despite the cost savings at the front-end, a no-action letter is often the
springboard to protracted federal court litigation.3 4 Federal court proxy
litigation often proceeds past the pleadings and into discovery, which can be a
timely and expensive process.35 Federal courts are then left to interpret the
relevant state law of incorporation without any meaningful guidance from the
SEC.36 Moreover, while federal courts are often up to the task of interpreting
state law, in many cases they are compelled to interpret state law in which they
lack the requisite expertise to consistently reach the appropriate disposition.37
Rather than engage in guesswork, some federal courts have certified questions
involving shareholder proxy laws to state courts when the issue is overly
complex or the state law is ambiguous.38 Yet even with certification available
in most states, federal courts are more likely to engage in their own
independent analysis of state law without engaging state courts, which have
more experience and expertise with state corporate governance statutes.39
As a result of the federal occupation of state law as it relates to
shareholder proposals, state courts are forced to address errors made by federal
courts and the SEC on the back-end. Such an occurrence is contrary to the text
34 Steven M. Bainbridge, The Casefor Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA
L. REv. 601,630-631 (2006) (noting that "shareholder insurrection" remains a costly
undertaking and requires support from a large number of investors).
35 Ahdeih, Dialectical Regulation, supra note 6 (citing Mark D. West, The Pricing of
Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan and the United States, 88 N.W.U. L. REV.
1436, 1463 (1994); see also John F. Olson, Professor Bebchuk 's Brave New World: A
Reply to "The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise," 93 VA. L. REv. 773, 778-779
(2007)).
36 See infra, note 26; see Ahdieh, supra note 35, at 172 n.51 (commenting that "[i]n
lieu of actual state law, the Division of Corporation Finance will occasionally make
vague references to considerations of policy") (citing Pac.-Telesis Group, SEC No-
Action Letter, 1989 WL 245523 (Feb. 2, 1989)).37 Ahdieh, supra note 35, at 180 (noting that Rule 14a-8 grants the SEC and the federal
courts have "near-complete autonomy from relevant state authorities, be they
legislatures, regulators, or courts" in determining how to handle suits concerning
shareholder proposals); see also Ahdieh, Intersystemic Governance, at 236 (arguing
that "[i]f consistency of interpretation is to be maintained, it is necessary for state
legislators and judges, on the one hand, and the SEC staff, on the other, to align their
expectations of what is possible-and desirable-in the proxy solicitation process")
(citing Robert B. Ahdieh, Law's Signal: A Cueing Theory of Law in Market
Transition, 77 S. CALL. REV. 215, 230-233 (2004)).
38 The use of certified questions by federal courts seems to indicate support for states
to develop a certification mechanism for the SEC. See Int'l Board of Teamsters Gen.
Fundv. Fleming Cos., Inc., 173 F.3d 863 (10t" Cir. 1999), certified question answered,
975 P.2d 907 (Okla. 1999); In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. Shareholder Derivative
Litigation, Nos. 06CV 1216JMR/FLN, 06CV 1 697JMR/FLN, 2006 WL 3456666, at * 1
(D. Minn. Nov. 29, 2006), certified question answered, 754 N.W.2d 544 (Minn. 2008)
(certified question on shareholder derivative suits); see also Ahdieh, supra note 36.
39 Id.
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of Rule 14a-8, which seems to contemplate cross-jurisdictional cooperation.4°
In fact, as Professor Nagy notes, Rule 14a-8 rests solely on an interpretation of
state law and the SEC does not have the required expertise and experience
with state law.4' Therefore, it is incumbent on the SEC and the federal courts
to create a role for state courts in the interpretation of Rule 14a-8 as it relates
to the validity of shareholder proposals. Professor Ahdieh, however, notes that
the present situation may have results contrary to Rule 14a-8. According to
Professor Ahdieh, while the SEC and federal courts are "nominally free to
assert whatever interpretation of state law [they] elect in assessing the
permissibility of shareholder proposals, state courts, as well as legislatures, are
likely to disregard cavalier interpretations. 42
The supposed framework for Rule 14a-8, as indicated by its text, is for
states to interpret their own laws of corporate governance to provide guidance
to the SEC and federal courts to resolve disputes involving shareholder
proposals. Although federal courts are required to examine state law as a part
of theirjudicial function, the SEC often refuses to take a definitive position on
the validity of a shareholder proposal when an ambiguous state law is
involved.43 In many cases, this hinders the ability of state courts to develop
much-needed precedent in the area of corporate governance. 44 The actions of
the SEC also reduce the likelihood that state legislatures will address issues of
corporate governance.45 Simply put, the concern for federal courts is accuracy
in their use of state law. For the SEC, however, the concerns are accuracy and
substantive analysis. In sum, when federal courts or the SEC erroneously
apply state law via Rule 14a-8, state courts must correct their mistakes. Such a
situation imposes substantial costs on state courts and creates inconsistent
40 See infra, note 5. It should also be noted, however, that Rule 14a-8 does not contain
an explicit requirement that the federal courts or the SEC defer to state court
interpretations of state law. See e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8
4 Nagy, supra note 7, at 1011.
42 Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, supra note 6, at 181 (citing Robert B. Ahdieh,
Between Dialogue andDecree: International Review ofNational Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 2029, 2078 n.214 (2004)).
43 See idat 173 (citing Transcript of Roundtable Discussion Regarding Federal Proxy
Rules & State Corporation Law, available at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/proxy-transcript05O707.pdf (May 7,
2007)).
4Brent H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison
Pills, 3 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 205, 256 (2006) ("The SEC's willingness to allow
companies to exclude bylaw proposals goes a long way to helping explain [the] lack of
precedent").45 See Fisch, supra note 30 ("State legislatures have become accustomed to leaving the
regulation of the voting process to the SEC and defer to that agency's expertise").
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legal precedent, resulting in an inefficient and erratic relationship between the
state and federal courts and the SEC.46
B. The Implications of the Amendment to the Delaware State
Constitution on Rule 14a-8 and the SEC.
Thus far, commentators have universally hailed the passage of the
recent amendment to the Delaware State Constitution permitting the SEC to
certify questions of state law to the Delaware Supreme Court.4 7  Some
commentators see the amendment as a mechanism to return state courts and
legislatures to the forefront of interpreting state law as it relates to shareholder
proposals under Rule 14a-8.' 8 Other commentators view the amendment as a
mechanism to foster cross-jurisdictional cooperation between the. federal
government and state courts. 4 9 The general consensus, however, is that the
amendment will alter the dynamic of federal and state relations as it relates to
the application of Rule 14a-8. °
The amendment was adopted to address a myriad of problems. First,
the Delaware General Assembly sought to permit the Delaware Supreme Court
to provide definitive answers to the SEC about questions concerning Delaware
law. 51 This is a response partly to the SEC's reluctance to take an authoritative
stance on issues involving ambiguous state law.52 Second, the Delaware
General Assembly hoped to eliminate the likelihood of the SEC submitting
erroneous interpretations of Delaware corporate law to the public. The
justification for the latter concern is twofold. One, "[b]y most accounts,
46 Professor Ahdieh describes the inefficiency as an "unending series of repeat plays,
each requiring action and reaction by the SEC and state courts or legislatures...."
Ahdieh, supra note 42.
47 Fredrick H. Alexander et. al., Corporate Governance: The View From Delaware,
SN071 ALI-ABA 147, 163 (Feb. 21-22, 2008) ("SEC access to the Delaware Supreme
Court may be a significant development given the current climate of stockholder
activism and 14a-8 proposals touching on questions of Delaware law"); Ahdieh,
Intersystemic Governance, supra note 4, at 235 ("Delaware's recent amendment of its
constitution to allow the SEC to directly certify questions to the Delaware Supreme
Court holds even greater promise"). Professor Larry E. Ribstein of the University of
Illinois College of Law notes in his blog entitled "Ideoblog" that his enthusiasm for
the amendment is based on his view that the SEC should not rule on the merits of
shareholder proposals, but that should be left to state courts and legislatures. See
http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2007/05/delaware-to-tak.html (last visited
October 8, 2008).
48 Professor Ribstein is particularly receptive of this view. See id.
49 Professor Ahdieh adopts this view of the amendment. Ahdieh, supra note 37.
50 See infra, note 45.
51 See infra, note 1.
52 See infra, note 36.
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Delaware law is the preeminent authority in corporate law principles.,
53
Therefore, many states courts refer to Delaware jurisprudence when
interpreting their own statutes of corporate governance and often follow the
judicial analysis promulgated by Delaware courts.5 4 Two, "[m]ore than 80
percent of the companies that have reincorporated during the past quarter
century have migrated to Delaware., 55 The high number of companies
incorporated in Delaware makes a clear statement of the law imperative-both
for overall functionality of those companies and the attractiveness of Delaware
as a potential state of incorporation. 56 Accordingly, the Delaware legislature
has historically provided Delaware courts immense discretion to fashion legal
rules and remedies to address difficulties associated with corporate
governance.5 7
Article 4, § 11(8) is a continuation of the deferential treatment the
Delaware legislature affords Delaware courts. Moreover, § 11 (8) represents a
formalization of the relationship between Delaware and the SEC. Although §
11(8) only permits one-way communication between Delaware courts and the
SEC, it presents an opportunity to synthesize the requirements of corporations
under both federal and Delaware law. What may emerge is a coherent set of
regulations governing shareholder proposals that encapsulates elements of
both federal and state law. As such, the ultimate success of § 11(8) will
depend primarily on the willingness of the SEC to have questions certified to
the Delaware Supreme Court. 58
53 David W. Ware, Note, Shareholders' Right to Review the Adoption and
Continuation of a Takeover Defense Plan: Is the Fleming Decision Dead on Arrival?,
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1053, 1063 (2000) (citing Ernest L. Folk, III, THE DELAWARE
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW, at xii (1972); Leo Herzel & Laura D. Richman,
Foreword, Delaware's Preeminence by Design, in THE DELAWARE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS F1, F-1 to F-10 (2d, ed. Supp. 1991 &
1992)).54 Id. at 1064.
55 id.
56 Dale Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute of Chills, Pills, Standstills, and Who
Gets Iced, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 883-884 (1988) ("Because Delaware is the
corporate home of 56% of the Fortune 500 firms and 45% of the firms listed on the
New York stock exchange, any change in the Delaware corporate code affects a
substantial number of shareholders").
51 See Ware, supra note 53, at 1064 ("...the Delaware legislature has had to place in
Delaware courts to fashion appropriate limits on many corporate transactions and
activities").
58 Certified questions are entitled to de novo review. See Save Our Creeks v. City of
Brooklyn Park, 699 N.W.2d 307, 309 (Minn. 2005); see also Hislop v. Dep 't of Social
Welfare, 388 A.2d 428, 429 (Vt. 1978) (noting that in some cases, courts can address
issues not certified to it).
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III. C.A., INC. v. AFSCME EMPLOYEES PENSION PLAN
In CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, the SEC invoked §
11(8) to certify two questions to the Delaware Supreme Court.59 Corporate
law practitioners noted the quickness in which the decision was issued-the
SEC certified the question on June 27,2008 and an opinion was issued on July
17, 2008-thereby alleviating concerns that the certification process would
prove too cumbersome.6 ° Practitioners also noted that the substantive nature
of the decision and the unanimous vote of the Court. 61 The certification
process under § 11(8) has shown itself to be fast, efficient, and able to produce
clear substantive legal doctrine and rules. Thus, the early returns of § 11 (8)
show a tremendous amount of promise.
A. Case Overview
In AFSCME, AFSCME, a CA stockholder, submitted a proposed
stockholder bylaw for
CA to include in its proxy materials for its 2008 annual meeting of
stockholders. 62  The proposal, if adopted, required CA to reimburse a
stockholder or group of stockholders for reasonable expenses incurred by
nominating a candidate or number of candidates in a contested election of
directors to the corporation's board of directors. 63 Afterwards, CA informed
the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance of its intention to exclude
AFSCME's proposed bylaw from its proxy materials. 64 CA requested a no-
action letter from the SEC stating that the Division would refrain from taking
any enforcement proceedings against CA if it excluded AFSCME's proposal.65
AFSCME issued a response to CA's request for a no-action letter, seeking the
contrary legal conclusion.66 As a result, the Division was faced with
conflicting legal interpretations of Delaware law.67 The Division certified the
following two questions to the Delaware Supreme Court: (1) Is the AFSCME
proposal a proper subject for action by shareholder as a matter of Delaware
law? (2) Would the AFSCME proposal, if adopted, cause CA to violate any
" 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008).
60 William D. Johnson, Del. Court responds to SEC's first certified questions,
VIRGINIA LAWYERS WEEKLY, at
http://www.valawyersweekly.com/weeklyedition/2008/09/29/del-court-responds-to-
sec's-first-certified-questions/ (last visited November 12, 2008).
61 Id
62 953 A.2d at 229.
6 3 Id. at 230.
64 id.
65 id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
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Delaware law to which it is subject? 68 The first question, according to the
Court, also raised two additional concerns. The first concern was the "scope
or reach of the shareholders' power to adopt, alter, or repeal the bylaws of a
Delaware corporation.,, 69 The second was "whether the [b]ylaw at issue [fell]
within that permissible scope."70
To address the first question, the Court cited §§ 109(b) and 102(b)(1)
of the Delaware General Corporate Law as essential to its analysis.7 1
AFSCME relied on those two provisions in asserting that the bylaw "[related]
to the right of the stockholders meaningfully to participate in the process of
electing directors, a right that necessarily 'includes the right to nominate an
opposing slate.' 7 2 In response, CA contended that § 109(b) was "not
dispositive, because it [could not] be read in isolation from, and without regard
to, Section [sic] 102(b)(I ).,73 Additionally, CA argued that the proposed
bylaw curtailed the "substantive decision-making authority of CA's board to
decide whether or not to expend corporate funds for a particular purpose, here,
reimbursing director election expenses., 74 According to CA, § 102(b)(1)
required any limitation placed on the authority of the board of directors be
enumerated in the certificate of incorporation.7 5 Thus, CA argued, the
proposed bylaw could only be contained in CA's certificate of incorporation
and fell outside the type of bylaws permitted by § 109(b).76
In addressing the parties' arguments concerning the first question, the
Court noted that "[i]t is well-established Delaware law that a proper function
of bylaws is not to mandate how the board should decide specific substantive
business decisions, but rather, to define the process and procedures by which
those decisions are made." 7  In its rejoinder to the Court's
68 Id. at 231.
69 Id. at 232.
70 id.
71 Id. at 233; see also Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 109(b) which provides that "...bylaws
may contain any provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of
incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and
its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or
employees."; Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102 (b)(1) states in relevant part: "[a]ny
provision for the management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the
corporation, and any provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers
of the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders, or any class of the
stockholders .... ; if such provisions are not contrary to the laws of this State. Any
provision which is required or permitted by any section of this chapter to be stated in
the bylaws may instead be stated in the certificate of incorporation."
72 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
73 Id. at 234.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 id.
77 Id. at 234-235.
114 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 4:1
JOURNAL
substantive/procedure distinction, CA asserted that the proposed bylaw limited
the board's discretion to decide whether to grant reimbursement in contested
board elections.18 Moreover, CA argued that because the proposed bylaw
required the mandatory expenditure of corporate funds, the proposed bylaw
was not merely procedural and process-oriented, but substantive and outside
the scope of what was permissible under § 109(b).79
The Court, however, found CA's argument unconvincing. In response,
the Court stated:
Because the Bylaw [sic] is couched as a
command to reimburse... it lends itself to
CA's criticism. But the Bylaw's wording,
although relevant, is not dispositive of
whether or not it is process-related .... By
saying this we do not mean to suggest that
this Bylaw's reimbursement component can
be ignored. What we do suggest is that a
bylaw [sic] that requires the expenditure of
corporate funds does not, for that reason
alone, become automatically deprived of its
process-related character. 80
The Court concluded that the proposed bylaw had "the intent and the effect of
regulating the process for electing directors of CA., 81 Accordingly, the Court
answered the first question in the affirmative and held that the proposed bylaw
at issue was a proper subject for shareholder action.
After establishing that the AFSCME's proposed bylaw did not violate
the Delaware General Corporate Law or CA's Certificate of Incorporation, the
Court turned its attention to the second question of whether the proposed
bylaw violated state statutory or common law. The Court began by stating that
"[o]ne of the most basic tenets of Delaware corporate law is that the board of
directors has the ultimate responsibility for managing the business and affairs
of a corporation. 82 Under that fundamental proposition, the Court examined
the proposed bylaw and the potential burden it placed on CA's board of
directors. The Court noted that in two similar cases it invalidated contracts that
required "a board to act or not act in such a fashion that would limit the
exercise of their fiduciary duties. 83 Though the prior cases concerned
18Id. at 236.
79 id.
80 Id. at 236 (footnotes omitted).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 232 n.6 (citing Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281,
1291-92 (Del. 1998)).
83 Id. (citing Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Quickturn, 721 A.2d at
1291).
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contracts limiting the actions of the board, the Court found the logic of the
prior cases fully applicable to AFSCME's proposed bylaw. The Court stated,
"the internal governance contract-which here takes the form of a bylaw-is
one that would also prevent the directors from exercising their full managerial
power in circumstances where their fiduciary duties would otherwise require
them to deny reimbursement to a dissident slate. 84
AFSCME contended that the results reached in the prior cases were
inapplicable because the proposed bylaw did not limit the discretion of CA's
board in considering reimbursements for contested election. 85 Instead, the
bylaw precluded the board from considering reimbursements at all. Therefore,
the CA board would not be prevented from fulfilling its fiduciary duty because
the issue of reimbursements would be removed entirely from the board's
duties. 86 The Court found AFSCME's argument unpersuasive. The Court held
that the board's fiduciary duties outweighed the merits of the proposed bylaw.
According to the Court:
It is in this respect that the proposed Bylaw
[sic], as written, would violate Delaware law
if enacted by CA's stockholders. As
presently drafted, the Bylaw would afford
CA's directors full discretion to determine
what amount of reimbursement is
appropriate, because the directors would be
obligated to grant only the 'reasonable'
expenses of a successful short slate.
Unfortunately, that does not go far enough,
because the Bylaw contains no language or
provision that would reserve to CA's
directors their full power to exercise their
fiduciary duty to decide whether or not it
would be appropriate, in a specific case,
award reimbursement at all. 87
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the bylaw violated Delaware law and
was invalid as a result.
84 Id. at 239.
85 id.
86 id.
87 Id. at 240 (emphasis in the original).
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B. The Potential Influence of AFSCME on the SEC No-action Letter
Process and Federal Court Adjudication
Unlike the reaction to the passage of the amendment, reaction to the
Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in AFSCME has been mixed. One
commentator notes as a result of AFSCME, the amendment will not result in a
change in federal and state authorities as it relates to Rule 14a-8.88
Specifically, the commentator noted that "[e]ven with this new route of
communication, Delaware is not talking about the key questions in a way that
would persuade future federal lawmakers to leave room for state law. ' 9 In
other words, the decision did not make a transcendent announcement on the
relationship between federal and state authorities. Rather the court inAFSCME
merely recited a well-known principle of corporate governance-
"shareholders get to vote on the less important matters of process in bylaws
with no barriers permitted to be inserted by directors, but can only speak on
the more important matters if the directors first propose an amendment to the
corporation's charter." 90 Another commentator further notes that AFSCME
leaves the underlying legal question-how to determine whether a proposed
bylaw forces a board to violate their fiduciary duties-largely unsettled. 91
Thus, the question is whether the amendment, post-AFSCME, despite its
efficiencies and opportunity for state court resolution, will produce the
substantive clear statements on the law it was intended to produce. A second
question arises, however, about whether the disposition in AFSCME will
actually change the method in which the SEC adjudicates cases via no-action
letters.
1. The Effect of AFSCME on SEC Adjudication
In response to the first question, other commentators have noted that
the objectives of AFSCME may have been twofold: (1) to produce a
substantive resolution to questions certified by the Court to the SEC; and (2) to
protect Delaware's institutional advantages over corporate governance that it
has developed through its statutory framework and case authority.92 Professor
Thompson has gone as far as stating that the motivation underlying AFSCME
88 Robert B. Thompson, Defining the Shareholder's Role, Defining a Role for State
Law: Folk at 40, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 771, 784 (2008).
89 Id.
9 0 Id.
9' Brett H. McDonnell, Bylaw Reforms for Delaware's Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J.
CoRP. L. 651, 668 (2008); see also Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Introduction: The
Delaware General Corporation Law for the 21st Century, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 611,
613 (2008).
92 See generally Thompson, supra note 88.
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may have been to maintain and even expand the ability of Delaware courts to
dictate corporate governance law. 93 According to Thompson:
The most dramatic advantage for Delaware,
when compared to a federal corporation law,
comes in providing the gap filling that is
necessarily required for any law. Today,
most American judge-made corporate law
occurs in Delaware and it is not likely that
the federal system can match what Delaware
creates in this realm. Ten judges, located for
the most part along two hallways in one city,
make and develop Delaware corporate law.
These jurists are repeat players, in that most
of the workload of the five members of the
Delaware Court of Chancery arises in
corporate law and a significant part of the
workload for the five Delaware Supreme
Courtjustices derives from corporate law as
well. Because of this work and their own
prior experiences, these judges have an
expertise in corporate law that can be seen,
for example, in discussions of valuation and
other deal-related issues that arise. The
typical federal judge who gets an occasional
corporate case as part of a docket dominated
by criminal and immigration matters is
simply not going to have the same expertise
to bring to a dispute about corporate issues.
Delaware judges interact with the corporate
academic and professional community in a
way that is not replicated in other fields.94
Thus, in some sense, it is accurate to state that the goal of the amendment and
AFSCME is not solely to produce accurate statements on Delaware law, but to
also protect Delaware's place as the preeminent jurisdiction for corporate law.
9' Id. at 775.
94 Id. (citing Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of
Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REv. 133,
166 (2004) (noting that seventy-five percent of the cases filed in the Delaware Court
of Chancery over a two year period were corporate cases)); see also Steven J.
Cleveland, Process Innovation in the Production of Corporate Law, 41 U.C. DAVIs L.
REv. 1829, 1841 (2008) (noting that § 11 allows for Delaware courts to retain its
competitive advantage over corporate governance law).
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Those two goals, however, are entirely consistent with the cross-
jurisdictional collaboration envisioned by Rule 14a-8. As previously
discussed, the text of Rule 14a-8 indicates that the statutory guidepost is state
law. 95 Additionally, the application of Rule 14a-8 is dependent on the
interpretation of state law, indicating that the interpretation of state law by
state courts takes priority under Rule 14a-8.9 6 Alternatively stated, under Rule
14a-8, federal courts and the SEC are supposed to take their cues from state
court determinations of state laws regarding corporate governance. AFSCME
does not depart from that understanding, nor does the amendment.
Moreover, criticism that AFSCMIE did not produce the transcendent
legal pronouncement to alter the federal and state relationship under Rule 14a-
8 is unwarranted. First, and the most obvious observation, is that AFSCME
may not have produced the correct factual circumstances for such a
pronouncement. The issue in AFSCME was disposed of by the Delaware
Supreme Court using a well-established common-law principle. 97 Second, as
evident from the text and syntax of Rule 14a-8, it is not incumbent on the state
courts to assert their authority to promulgate rules of corporate governance.
Rather, the SEC and federal courts are obligated under Rule 14a-8 to limit
their encroachment on state corporate governance law. The Delaware Supreme
Court's need to protect its institutional advantages from federal encroachment
highlights the increasing intrusions of the SEC and federal courts into state
law.
2. The Monsanto No-Action Letter
The second question, whether AFSCME will change the method in
which the SEC disposes of cases via no-action letters, is unclear. One early
indication that the amendment may change the no-action letter process is that
the SEC did, in fact, take advantage of the amendment. Yet, in a no-action
letter citing AFSCME, the SEC did not provide the detailed explanation that
was expected. 98 The shareholder proposal at issue in the Monsanto no-action
letter contained a provision that proposed to establish a requirement forcing
the directors of Monsanto, a Delaware corporation, to take an oath of
allegiance to the United States Constitution.99 Proponents of the proposal
intended to include it as a part of Monsanto's 2008 proxy statement. 100 Special
counsel to Monsanto rejected the proposal for a number of reasons. First and
most notably, special counsel found the proposal problematic because "it
would limit the directors' exercise of their fiduciary duties."' 01 Citing
9' See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1)..
96 See Nagy, supra note 7, at 1010-11.
97 See Thompson, supra note 87, at 784.98 See Monsanto Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 5433185, at *1 (Nov. 7,2008).
9 9 1d. at *15-*16.
1oo Id.
1o' Id. at *14.
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AFSCME, special counsel noted that the proposed bylaw would constitute an
"internal governance contract" that would require "the directors to subordinate
their fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of the Company and its
shareowners to a supervening duty to act in a manner consistent with the oath
contemplated by the Proposed Bylaw [sic]." 0 2 Special counsel elaborated in
the following way:
Because the Proposed Bylaw could result in
a circumstance in which the Board's
obligation to act in accordance with its
fiduciary duties would be compromised by a
concomitant duty to comply with the
Proposed Bylaw, the Proposed Bylaw, under
the principles of CA, would be found to be
invalid .... Under Delaware law, a board may
expend corporate funds to reimburse proxy
expenses "[w]here the controversy is
concerned with a question of policy as
distinguished from personnel o[r]
management." But in a situation where the
proxy contest is motivated by personal or
petty concerns, or to promote interests that
do not further, or are adverse to, those of the
corporation, the board's fiduciary duty could
compel that reimbursement be denied
altogether.") [sic]. 103
In response, proponents of the proposal sought review from the SEC and
requested that the agency takes steps to compel Monsanto to include the
proposal with the corporation's 2008 proxy materials.
According to proponents of the proposal, an oath of allegiance was
necessary and did not constitute "unreasonable or unfair qualifications"
because Monsanto had influence throughout every level of the federal
government. '04 Additionally, proponents of the proposal pointed to the fact
that given Monsanto's status as one of the world's largest agribusinesses, an
oath of allegiance was needed to ensure that Monsanto's board of directors
would adhere to the laws and interests of the United States. 105 The proponents
of the proposals were also concerned about the presence of foreign nationals
on the board of Monsanto. 06 Yet foreign nationals, who voluntarily subjected
102 id.
103 Id at *14.
°4'Id. at *5.
105 Id. at *5-*6.
106 Id. at *6.
120 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 4:1
JOURNAL
themselves to the laws of the United States, were irrelevant to Monsanto's
adoption of standards to govern the behavior of its corporate directors.' 07
Proponents of the proposal also took issue with Monsanto's contention
that an oath to the United States Constitution "would impermissibly restrict the
directors' exercise of their fiduciary duties."108 First, proponents of the
proposal responded that high-ranking government officials regularly serve on
boards of trustees.' 09 Second, proponents of the proposal noted that if a trustee
complied with a fiduciary duty that violated the Constitution, then it would
result in an "unlawful action" which would be inconsistent with a fiduciary
duty." 0 Finally, the proponents of the proposal urged that the proposal was
consistent with Rules 14a-8(i)(3) and 14a-8(i)(6). The proposal was consistent
with the Rules because the proposal did not create or imply any authority "to
represent directors as agents of the U.S. government." '" Nor did the proposal
enumerate an enforcement mechanism for use against a dissenting trustee. 12
In response, special counsel relying on AFSCME and the Delaware
Chancery Court's disposition in Stroud v. Grace, reiterated that the proposal
"(1) impose[d] an unreasonable and unfair qualification on directors and (2)
would require the directors to violate their fiduciary duties."' 13 Special counsel
also contested whether the proposal was consistent with Rules 14a-8(i)(3) and
14a-8(i)(6) by asking whether a director of a Delaware corporation, after
taking an oath of allegiance to the United States and Constitution, would have
an obligation to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic?" ' 14 Special counsel also noted that
the proposal did not include sufficient information to determine what
constitutes a violation of the proposal." 5 Accordingly, special counsel urged
the SEC to withhold enforcement action against Monsanto.
After considering the various arguments asserted by Monsanto and
proponents of the proposal, the SEC summarized its findings as follows:
There appears to be some basis for your
view that Monsanto may exclude the
proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(2). We note that
in the opinion of your counsel,
implementation of the proposal would cause
Monsanto to violate state law. Accordingly,
'07 Id. at *6.
'
08 Id. at *7.
'09 Id. at *5.
110Id
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at *2; see also Stroudv. Grace, No. 10719, 1990 WL 176803, at *1 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 1, 1990), revd on other grounds, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992).
114 Monsanto No-Action Letter, supra note 98, at *3.
... Id. at *3.
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we will not recommend enforcement action
to the Commission if Monsanto omits the
proposal from its proxy materials in reliance
on rule 14a-8(i)(2). In reaching this position,
we have not found it necessary to address
the alternative bases for omission upon
which Monsanto relies. 116
At first glance, the SEC's disposition in the Monsanto no-action does not seem
any different then the no-action letter issued in Pfizer. 17 The seemingly lack
of substantive analysis in the Monsanto no-action letter may expose § 11 and
the court's decision in AFSCME to the charge that the amendment and
AFSCME did nothing to affect the method in which the SEC uses no-action to
dispose of shareholder proposal disputes. Yet the shareholder proposal in
Monsanto fell squarely within the court's disposition inAFSCME. Thus, with
a clear governing rule articulated by the Delaware Supreme Court, there was
no reason for the SEC to engage in an extended discussion of case authority.
Despite the view of some commentators to the contrary, the rule announced by
the court in AFSCME was clear-shareholder bylaws may define procedure
and process, but not the substantive business decisions to be made by a
corporation's board. 18 While the court refrained from providing the specificity
urged by Professor McDonnell to determine when a proposed bylaw
encroaches on the authority of board members to make substantive business
decisions, the court may have implicitly recognized that it will determine what
constitutes an invalid bylaw on a fact-specific basis. ' 19 Following the court's
lead in AFSCME, the SEC determined that given the particular facts
concerning the Monsanto no-action letter, the proposal fell squarely within the
rule announced in that case.
Criticism of the SEC has mainly centered on its willingness to issue
pronouncements of state law without sufficient guidance from state courts.
20
While the Monsanto no-action letter seems contrary to that criticism, it may
not be indicative of an impending change in the SEC no-letter process. The
16 Id at *1.
117 See generally Pfizer SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 24.
118 See AFSCME, 953 A.2d at 232-33.
119 Richard C. Morrisey, Eighth Annual Institute on Securities in Europe: A Contrast
in EU and U.S. Provisions, 1712 PLI/Corp 921, 937 (2009) ("The Court's decision
makes clear that bylaws may not "mandate how the board should decide specific
substantive business decisions, but may "define the process and procedures by which
those decisions are made. Where the line will be drawn between those bylaws that
mandate substantive decisions and bylaws that are procedural likely will be decided by
the Delaware courts on a case-by-case basis in the future.") (internal quotations
omitted).
120 See Ahdieh, supra note 35, at 172 n.51.
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opportunity still exists for the SEC to go astray and continue to issue
pronouncement of state law with minimal state guidance. Moreover, unlike
Monsanto, not every shareholder proposal dispute will fall squarely within a
recently defined rule by the Delaware Supreme Court. To that effect, even
with the presence of § 11, the SEC should take better efforts to explain the
rationale underlying its dispositions. Furthermore, § 11 operates as a constraint
on the SEC's ability to freelance with state law. First, as previously noted, the
amendment creates an avenue for the SEC to forward questions of state law to
the Delaware Supreme Court.12 1 Second, as AFSCME and the Monsanto no-
action letter demonstrates, the amendment permits the Delaware Supreme
Court to develop a line of precedent to govern future shareholder proposal
disputes. 1 As in Monsanto, the amendment allows for adverse parties to cite
applicable case precedent for the SEC to rely on in making its adjudication.
Thus, the decision of the SEC has some discernible precedential basis.
3. Federal Treatment of Future SEC No-Action Letters
Another issue related to how the SEC handles no-action procedure
going forward is what treatment federal courts will give to no-action letters. As
previously noted, federal courts do not afford much weight to no-action
letters. 123 SEC no-action letters do not receive the benefit of Chevron
deference and federal courts review no-letter cases de novo. 12 4 Yet it is
axiomatic that state court determinations are entitled to immense deference by
federal courts. 25 Thus, a question emerges concerning whether federal courts
will afford deference to the SEC when its no-action letters are supported by a
certified question resolved by a state court. Although there is little research on
the issue, the method in which federal courts certify questions to state courts
may prove illustrative in how federal courts may treat SEC no-action letters
121 See generally 2007 Amendments to Delaware Corporate Law, supra note 3.
122 See McDonnell, supra note 44.
123 See e.g., Amalgamated, 15 F.3d at 257; see also American International Group,
361 F. Supp.2d at 344.
124 See Roosevelt, 958 F.2d at 427; New York City Employees 'Ret. Sys., ,45 F.3d at 7;
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 939 (1995) (noting that
questions of law are decided on a de novo basis).
1258ee, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that there is no
general federal common law and that federal courts are obligated to apply state law in
diversity cases); see also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District
Court of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Johnson v.
DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-1006 (1994) ("a party losing in state court is barred
from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a
United States District Court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment
itself violates the loser's federal rights"); Hagerty v. Succession of Clement, 749 F.2d
217, 220 (5th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 474 U.S. 968 (1985) (holding that a plaintiff
cannot seek a reversal of a state court judgment by filing a federal court action).
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that are supplemented by a resolved certified question by the Delaware
Supreme Court.
Although the United States Supreme Court has not issued a definitive
standard for when federal courts should certify a question to a state court, the
Fifth Circuit has developed a widely -used set of criterion. 126 According to the
Fifth Circuit, the relevant considerations are: (1) most importantly, the
closeness of the question and the existence of sufficient sources of state law-
statutes, judicial decisions, Attorney General's opinions-to allow the federal
court to make a principled, rather than a conjectural, conclusion; (2) the degree
to which considerations of comity are relevant in light of the particular issue
and case to be decided; and (3) delay, and the possible inability to frame the
issue, so as to produce a helpful response from the state court. 12 If one or
more of those factors become relevant, then a federal court should certify the
question and submit it to the state court. 12 Moreover, when there is
uncertainty about the status of state law, the federal courts should militate in
favor of certifying a question to the state court. 129 Once a state court answers a
certified question, the state court resolution is treated as authoritatively
establishing the applicable state law.' 
30
SEC certification under § I 1 seemingly addresses the elements federal
courts consider when deciding to certify a question to the Delaware Supreme
Court. The first element of the Fifth Circuit's analysis-the closeness of the
question and the existence of sufficient sources of state law-alternatively
stated, the presence of ambiguity in state law-is addressed by the fact that the
relevant state actor, the Delaware Supreme Court, is permitted to issue
authoritative pronouncements of state law. Under both § 11 and the federal
court certification procedure, the standard for permitting a state court to certify
a question is seemingly the same-"where we find no state law precedent on
point and where the public policy aims are conflicting the case may properly
126See, e.g., Williamson v. ElfAquitaine, Inc., 138 F.3d 546, 549 (5th Cir. 1998); see
also State of Fla. ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266,274-75 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 829 (1976).
127 id.
128 id.
129 See, e.g., Fiat Motors of North America, Inc. v. Mayor and Council of City of
Wilmington, 619 F. Supp. 29, 34 (D. Del. 1985) (citing Hatfield v. Bishop Clarkson
Memorial Hospital, 701 F.2d 1266, 1268 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc); Kershner v.
Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1982); Lillard v. Delaware State Hospitalfor the
Chronically Ill, 552 F. Supp. 711,722 (D. Del. 1982)); see also Barnes v. Atlantic &
Pacific Life Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 514 F.2d 704, 705 n.4 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[w]hen the
state law is in doubt especially on the underlying public policy aims, it is in the best
administration ofjustice to afford the litigants a consistent final judicial resolution by
utilizing the certification procedure.").
130 Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Limited, 363 U.S. 207,212 (1960) (citingAllegheny County
v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185,189 (1959); Meredith v. City of Winter Heaven,
320 U.S. 228, 236 (1943)).
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be certified to the state court."'' Having the state court act as the final arbiter
of state law-which occurs under both § 11 and federal court certification
procedure-is consistent with the traditional notions of comity and the roles
assigned to federal and state courts in our bifurcated legal system. 
32
Furthermore, as it relates to comity, Rule 14a-8 anticipates that state
courts will receive the paramount role in defining its own laws of corporate
governance. 133 The certification process enumerated in § 11, assuming that it is
properly employed by the SEC, gives the Delaware Supreme Court the first
opportunity to dispose of the legal ambiguity with finality. 34 The fact that
federal courts are likely to develop their own interpretations of state corporate
governance law without guidance from state courts is contrary to the
conventional understanding that state courts are the conclusive authority of
state law. 135 While § 11 is unlikely to deter federal courts from deciding cases
where state law is unclear, it may be helpful in eliminating duplicative state
and federal proceedings-federal courts make pronouncements after
construing unclear state law and state courts must correct the erroneous
pronouncements in later cases. 13 6 As § 11 permits, the Delaware Supreme
Court will have the opportunity to'address unclear state law on the front-end,
in order to eliminate subsequent erroneous interpretations of Delaware state
law by federal courts and the SEC. 137 Moreover, the Delaware Supreme Court
will have an opportunity to develop a line of precedent that governs future
SEC and federal court resolutions without the need for protracted litigation and
time-consuming ventures to discern unclear state law. 1
38
In particular, with comity, Delaware has additional advantages
because of its expertise and preeminence in corporate governance law. First, as
it relates to corporate governance law, the Delaware Supreme Court has issued
131 Hatfield, 701 F.2d at 1267. Neither the SEC nor the Delaware Supreme Court have
determined the procedure or conditions in which the Delaware Supreme Court may
hear a certified question from the SEC. The amendment allows for the court to "define
generally the conditions under which questions may be certified to it and prescribe
methods of certification." Del. CONST. art. 4, § 11(8).
132 .Hatfield, 701 F.2d at 1268 (citing Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311
U.S. 538 (1941)) ("[t]he state court ruling is binding on the federal courts and must be
applied to this case regardless of the stage the case has reached").
133 See Nagy, supra note 41, at 1011.
134 See generally 2007 Amendments to Delaware Corporate Law, supra note 3
131 See Hatfield, 701 F.2d at 1268..
136 See Nagy, supra note 41, at 1011.
137 See Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, at 181 ("By seeking greater and more thorough
input by knowledgeable parties, meanwhile, the Division [of Corporate Finance] might
not face any more difficult a task of analysis .... While this will require an increased
investment of time on the front-end, this initially steep learning curve will eventually
be climbed, permitting the resolution of no-action requests both expeditiously and
meaningfully") (emphasis in original).
138 See McDonnell, supra note 44.
2009] Taking a Backseat: How Delaware Can Alter the Role of the 125
SEC in Evaluating Shareholder Proposals
a number of opinions cited as persuasive authority in other jurisdictions.139
Additionally, due to Delaware's status as the preeminent jurisdiction for
incorporation, Delaware courts have developed a long line of precedent to
govern a number of different areas, resulting in more corporations
reincorporating in Delaware and "greater predictability with respect to legal
affairs."140 Second, federal courts, because of the abundance of states that have
adopted Delaware corporate statutory framework and their lack of expertise in
corporate law, have found the opinions of Delaware particularly persuasive in
addressing corporate law issues. 14 Thus, because of Delaware's expertise,
experience, and trend-setting corporate statutory framework, federal courts
may pay more attention and ultimately defer to answers of certified questions
by the Delaware Supreme Court contained in SEC no-action letters.
The third prong of the Fifth Circuit's analysis-the possibility of
delay-is not at issue with a SEC no-action letter. In most cases, it is the
adverse parties that seek adjudication through the SEC no-action letter process
because of its cost effectiveness. 142 Thus, the voluntary nature of litigants to
participate in the SEC no-action letter process alleviates concerns about
potential delays in adjudication and the onerous burdens that may result.
Moreover, AFSCME has proven that the timeframe for a certified question to
be answered by the Delaware Supreme Court is relatively short, complete with
139 Demetrios G. Kaouris, Is Delaware Still A Haven for Incorporation, 20 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 965-976 (1995) (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) and
noting that the decision has been cited in California, Indiana, Iowa, North Carolina,
and Texas); but see, William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of
Delaware Law's Continuing Success, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK, Dec. 18,
2008, available at: http://papers.ssm.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstract id=999477#
(challenging the view that Delaware is the preeminent jurisdiction for corporate law).
140 Kaouris, supra note 139,, at 977 (citing Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Toward an Interest-Group Theory ofDelaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REv. 469,
469 n. 1, 484 (1987)). Kaouris also notes that due to large number of cases filed with
Delaware courts, there is a higher likelihood that Delaware courts "have addressed a
particular problem or issue than other state courts." Id. (citing Lewis S. Black, Jr.,
Why Corporations Choose Delaware 3, 9 (1993)); see also Jens Dammann & Henry
Hansmann, Globalizing CommercialLitigation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2008)
(noting that corporate law cases comprise three quarters of the caseload for the
Delaware Chancery Court).
141 See International Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1459 n.22 (1 th Cir. 1989)
(noting that Florida relies on Delaware corporate law when interpreting its own
corporate statutes); see also IBS Financial Corp. v. Seidman & Associates, LLC, 136
F.3d 940, 949-50 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that New Jersey relies on Delaware corporate
law); In re Ivan F. Boesky Securities Litigation, 129 F.R.D. 89, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(noting that Delaware is the "fountainhead of American corporations" and that
Delaware courts "are known for their expert exposition of corporate law."); Hilton
Hotels Corp. v. 177 Corp., 978 F. Supp. 1342, 1346 (D. Nev. 1997) (noting that
Nevada relies on Delaware law to interpret its own corporate law).
142 See Lemke, supra note 18, at 1022.
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a substantive analysis of the legal issue at hand.143 As a result, the Delaware
Supreme Court promotes both judicial economy and prevents unnecessary
delay in the adjudication of shareholder proposal disputes. Through the SEC
no-action letter process, when supported by an answered certified question,
litigants receive a well-developed substantive resolution of the legal issue at
minimal cost.'44
Having rendered § 11 certification roughly analogous to the
certification procedure used by federal courts, there is no reason why the
federal courts should continue to treat SEC no-action letters as persuasive,
non-binding authority. 145 Between federal certification and certification under
§ 11, the only difference is the actor initiating the certification process. The
Delaware Supreme Court, the ultimate arbiter of Delaware state law, is given
the principal position in interpreting state law under § 11. Conversely, with the
presence of the certification under § 11, if federal courts do not afford
sufficient deference to SEC no-action letters, those courts risk discounting the
resolutions of state courts-here, the Delaware Supreme Court. Such a result
would be inconsistent with what is required by Rule 14a-8 and the traditional
respect afforded by federal courts toward state court decisions. 1
46
V. CONCLUSION
Section 11 of the Delaware State Constitution presents an opportunity
for greater inter-jurisdictional cooperation, which was originally envisioned in
Rule 14a-8. Furthermore, the amendment stands to eliminate the difficulties
associated with SEC no-action letters and federal court adjudications. The
amendment puts the Delaware Supreme Court in the forefront of determining
its own law of corporate governance, leaving federal courts and the SEC to
adhere to the court's determination of state law. As a result, litigants receive
substantive treatment of their disputes by a state court that has developed the
requisite expertise to handle a great majority of corporate issues submitted to
it. In addition to the substantive nature of the court's opinions, the court has
shown the ability to respond to certified questions in a timely and efficient
manner. § 11 is also consistent with the federal certification process, providing
some indicia that the state court determination as contained in a no-action
143 See Johnson, supra note 60, at
http://www.valawyersweekly.com/weeklyedition/2008/09/29/del-court-responds-to-
sec's-first-certified-questions/.
144 id.
145 See Amalgamated, 15 F.3d at 257; but see Nagy, supra note 7, at 967.
146 This is not an argument for Chevron deference. Rather, this argument relies more
on the traditional notions of comity and federal court respect for state court
adjudications. In essence, the focus of the federal court's respect should be on the state
court and not the SEC's role as an administrative agency. In that sense, the presence of
the SEC is irrelevant, particularly when the state court has issued its interpretation of
the state law at issue.
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letter is entitled to some deference in accordance with traditional notions of
comity and federal-state court relations.
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